Following important work by Pizarro, Uhlmann and Salovey (2003) on moral judgments of uncontrolled/impulsive versus controlled/ deliberate action, we focus on the related issue of the moral evaluation of emotion-motivated versus principle-driven behavior. We examine: (a) the potential lesser blameworthiness of antisocial acts perceived as driven by emotion as opposed to principle; (b) how factors governing the moral evaluation of antisocial acts might extend to the evaluation of prosocial acts; and (c) how overriding a moral emotion in favor of a (...) moral principle affects moral attributions. (shrink)

Ethical review of applications to conduct research projects continues to be a focus of scrutiny and controversy. We argue that attention to the actual practices of ethical review has the potential to inform debate. We explore how research ethics committees (RECs) establish their position and authority through the texts they use in their correspondence with applicants. Using a discursive analysis applied to 260 letters, we identify four positions of particular interest: RECs positioned as disinterested and responsible; as representing the interests (...) of potential participants; as facilitating ethically sound, high-quality research; and as engaged in dialogue. These positions are used strategically to deflect criticism or complaint. This analysis has implications for reducing contestation between researchers and RECs, suggesting that more dialogic rather than hierarchical approaches to positioning might be helpful. (shrink)

The last 20 years have seen the development of a new form of therapy, compassion focused therapy. Although CFT has a growing evidence base, there have been few studies of CFT outside of an Anglo-European cultural context. In this paper, we ask: Might a CFT-based approach be of value for Indigenous Australians? If so, what kind of cultural adaptations might be needed? We report the findings from a pilot study of an arts-based compassion skills training group, in which usual CFT (...) group processes were significantly adapted to meet the needs of Indigenous Australians. At face value, CFT appeared to be a promising approach to enhancing the social and emotional wellbeing of Australia’s Indigenous peoples. However, despite initial consultations with Indigenous health professionals, the first attempts to offer a more conventional group-based CFT to Indigenous clients were largely unsuccessful. Following a review and advice from two Indigenous clients, we combined elements of CFT with visual arts to develop a new approach, “arts-based compassion skills training”. This paper reports an evaluation of this pilot ABCST group. The group had 6 × 4 h sessions of ABCST, facilitated by two psychologists and two artists. There were 10 participants, who attended between 2 and 6 sessions: five were clients, five were health professionals. Between 1 and 3 months later, six of the participants were interviewed. Qualitative analysis of interview data identified that two key processes—creating a positive group atmosphere and channeling compassion skills training through the medium of visual arts—led to four positive outcomes for participants: planting the seeds of new understandings, embodying the skills of compassion, strengthening relationships with others, and evolving a more self-compassionate relationship. We suggest that the preliminary results are sufficiently encouraging to warrant further development of ABCST in Indigenous communities. (shrink)

Current local and national demographic trends have deepened the existing and formed new global demographic processes that have received a new historical reasoning that requires deep scientific research taking into account the influence of the multifactorial global dimension of the modern society development. The purpose of the article is to study the development of global demographic processes and to define the causes of their occurrence, manifestations, implications and prospects for implementation in the first half of the 21st century. The authors (...) have identified and characterized four global demographic processes, namely population growth, migration, increase of tourism, and change in population structure. It is projected that in the 30’s of the 21st century, the number and growth rates of the world population will reach the objective growth and these dynamics over the next two decades will begin to change in the direction of reducing the growth rates, which will lead to gradual stabilization, and eventually reduce the size of the world population. By the middle of the 21st century, one can observe the preservation of the growth rates of international and domestic migration, the growth of international migration flows from the South to the North and from the East to the West, the strengthening of new economically developed centers of gravity (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), the increase in migration of rural population to cities, as well as urbanization and activation of the metropolises development. The share of international tourists in comparison with the world population will be constantly increasing, and the annual growth rate of the number of international tourists will significantly depend on the world economy and may vary at the several percent level. Permanent change will occur in the age, religious-cultural and socio-economic structure of the population. (shrink)

Western philosophy’s relationship with prisons stretches from Plato’s own incarceration to the modern era of mass incarceration. Philosophy Imprisoned: The Love of Wisdom in the Age of Mass Incarceration draws together a broad range of philosophical thinkers, from both inside and outside prison walls, in the United States and beyond, who draw on a variety of critical perspectives (including phenomenology, deconstruction, and feminist theory) and historical and contemporary figures in philosophy (including Kant, Hegel, Foucault, and Angela Davis) to think about (...) prisons in this new historical era. All of these contributors have experiences within prison walls: some are or have been incarcerated, some have taught or are teaching in prisons, and all have been students of both philosophy and the carceral system. The powerful testimonials and theoretical arguments are appropriate reading not only for philosophers and prison theorists generally, but also for prison reformers and abolitionists. (shrink)

This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

In the course of his argument for a common law conception of Constitu- tional Bills of Rights and judicial review, Wil Waluchow claims that there is a principled distinction to be drawn between a community’s ‘opinions’ or ‘mere moral preferences’ and its ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ moral commitments. Moreover, he argues that it is possible for judges to identify a community’s authentic moral commitments and apply them to decide particular cases. If he is right, it is not the case that judges, (...) in making a decision about the application and scope of constitutional rights, are inevitably importing their own subjective moral standards into the decision. I analyze Waluchow’s use of the moral opinions -moral commitments distinction. I argue first that the distinction presupposes a descriptive methodology of constitutional interpretation. I suggest however, that the methodology of interpretation in Bills of Rights cases is constructive and involves substantive, ‘evaluative and justificatory’ reasoning by interpreters and judges. I then argue that the moral opinions-moral commitments distinction either cannot do the work that Waluchow’s argument requires, or, if it is modified to do the work, it becomes a substantive distinction. A substantive conception of authenticity creates a problem for Waluchow because it undermines his purely procedural account of democratic self-governance.Resumen:Wil Waluchow al desarrollar su argumento a favor de una concepción propia del common law para las constituciones y para el judicial review, sostiene que existe una distinción de principio entre las “opiniones” de la comunidad o sus “simples preferencias morales” y los compromisos morales “verdaderos” o “auténticos”. Además, sostiene que para los jueces es posible identificar los compromisos morales auténticos de una comunidad y aplicar los mismos en la decisión de casos concretos. Si tiene razón, entonces los jueces al decidir casos concretos sobre el alcance de los derechos constitucionales no canalizan sus propios estándares mora- les subjetivos a las decisiones. En este estudio analizo el uso que hace Waluchow de la distinción entre opiniones morales y compromisos morales. Argumento en primer término que la distinción presupone una metodología descriptiva de la interpretación constitucional, y sugiero que no obstante lo anterior, la metodología de interpretación de los derechos constitucionales es constructiva e implica por parte de los intérpretes y jueces un razonamiento “evaluativo y de justificación” sustantivo. Posteriormente argumento que la distinción entre opiniones morales y compromisos morales no tiene el alcance que pretende y requiere el trabajo de Waluchow y si se modifica, entonces se convierte en una distinción sustantiva. Una concepción sustantiva de autenticidad le genera un problema a Waluchow porque debilita su explicación puramente procedi- mental de un auto-gobierno democrático. (shrink)

Las emociones hacen referencia, tanto en el lenguaje común como en el filosófico y científico, a una dimensión de la vida subjetiva que no está suficientemente delimitada. El objetivo de este trabajo es el de aproximarnos al fenómeno emocional a través del estudio de varias problemáticas asociadas al mismo. Por un lado, se realiza un análisis etimológico y conceptual de algunas nociones habitualmente relacionadas con las emociones, como es el caso de los términos �afección�, �sentimiento�, �feeling� o �Stimmung�. Por otro (...) lado, se realiza un recorrido por aquellas disciplinas teóricas que implícita o explícitamente contienen una teoría de la emoción, desde la filosofía de Descartes hasta las ciencias cognitivas, pasando por la ética, la estética y la fenomenología. Por último se propone una fenomenología del corazón que permita dar cuenta del tipo de movilidad y de temporalidad propio del régimen emocional, permitiéndonos así tener acceso a un núcleo experiencial. (shrink)

The first annual Alchemy Lecture brings four deep and agile writers from different geographies and disciplines into vibrant conversation on a topic of urgent relevance: humans and borders. Borders, Human Itineraries, and All Our Relation captures and expands those conversations in insightful, passionate ways. Architect, artist, and urban theorist Dele Adeyemo (UK/Nigeria) calls attention to the complexity of Black infrastructures, questioning how "the environments that surround us condition the possibility of our being." Poet Natalie Diaz (US/Mojave/Akimel O'otham) writes: "Like (...) story, migration is the sensual movement of knowledge," and asks, "What is the language we need to live right now?" Philosopher Nadia Yala Kisukidi (France) suggests there is no diasporic life "without the dynamics of fabulation, where we pass down, from generation to generation, the stories of our ancestors who walked barefoot for many months." And cultural theorist Rinaldo Walcott (Canada) asks us to consider inheritances beyond white supremacist logics: "What might it mean to live a life, if we can't risk desiring and working towards utopia?" As each Alchemist considers the legacies of anticolonial struggle, the future of the planet, and the textures of Black and Indigenous life, their essays speak to each other in multiple ways, creating something startling and revelatory: a vision of the world as it is, and as it could be. (shrink)

Carlo Natali se ocupa de examinar las bases y detalles del debate de Alejandro con los deterministas, así como sus razones para mostrar el papel decisivo de la deliberación en la explicación de la acción. El punto de partida de Alejandro es el capítulo 9 del De interpretatione, texto que indica de una manera bastante clara que Aristóteles visualizó las consecuencias, absurdas en su opinión, del determinismo. En su discusión Natali examina la influencia de los argumentos de Alejandro en el (...) comentario de Boecio al De interpretatione; un aspecto particularmente destacable del ensayo de Natali es que éste muestra que Alejandro –y Aspacio antes de él–, aun dando por supuesta la relevancia decisiva de la deliberación en la explicación de la acción, modifica en parte la teoría aristotélica de la deliberación, ya que trata de adaptarla a la nueva situación cultural y al nuevo debate filosófico de su tiempo. Natali hace notar que la aparente incorporación por parte de Alejandro de terminología y nociones estoicas (como la de asentimiento) es parte de una inteligente estrategia para combatir a los deterministas estoicos en su propio terreno: lo decisivo es la deliberación como ingrediente central en la explicación de la acción, así como el hecho de poder elegir una cosa o algo distinto de ella (De fato 178, 22), si eso parece preferible. (shrink)

Carlo Natali se ocupa de examinar las bases y detalles del debate de Alejandro con los deterministas, así como sus razones para mostrar el papel decisivo de la deliberación en la explicación de la acción. El punto de partida de Alejandro es el capítulo 9 del De interpretatione, texto que indica de una manera bastante clara que Aristóteles visualizó las consecuencias, absurdas en su opinión, del determinismo. En su discusión Natali examina la influencia de los argumentos de Alejandro en el (...) comentario de Boecio al De interpretatione; un aspecto particularmente destacable del ensayo de Natali es que éste muestra que Alejandro –y Aspacio antes de él–, aun dando por supuesta la relevancia decisiva de la deliberación en la explicación de la acción, modifica en parte la teoría aristotélica de la deliberación, ya que trata de adaptarla a la nueva situación cultural y al nuevo debate filosófico de su tiempo. Natali hace notar que la aparente incorporación por parte de Alejandro de terminología y nociones estoicas (como la de asentimiento) es parte de una inteligente estrategia para combatir a los deterministas estoicos en su propio terreno: lo decisivo es la deliberación como ingrediente central en la explicación de la acción, así como el hecho de poder elegir una cosa o algo distinto de ella (De fato 178, 22), si eso parece preferible. (shrink)

La quinta parte de la Ética a Nicómaco (en adelante, EN) está dedicada al tema de la amistad. Su ubicación dentro del texto —en medio del discurso sobre el placer, el dolor y la eudaimonía— parece responder a que la amistad ya no es una virtud como tal, sino una clase de virtud o está acompañada de la virtud; por tanto, no se encuentra dentro de lo dedicado a la moralística, aunque parece que esta es fundamental dentro de la reflexión (...) de una vida buena. Podría situarse a la amistad dentro de los bienes relacionales, como aquellos absolutamente necesarios para una vida floreciente, pero que no obedecen a una virtud particular, sino que sus acciones se relacionan con el ejercicio de varias de ellas. También vale la pena apuntar el tratamiento de la philia dentro de un texto dedicado a la cosa pública, lo que evidencia que estamos entendiendo la philia dentro de un contexto amplio de relaciones sociales. El término philia es más extenso que nuestra versión reductiva de amistad, aunque lo implica. La amistad en Aristóteles permite ver la conexión entre las diferentes relaciones sociales que se tejen en una vida floreciente (dimensión familiar, social, política y económica). Así, dentro de un proyecto de vida buena, las actividades de interacción con el otro implican los vínculos de la amistad que permiten lograr la adquisición del bien, ya sea entendido como placer, utilidad y/o virtud. Lo anterior permite entender la importancia de seguir pensando con Aristóteles sobre el lugar de la amistad en nuestras vidas y la necesidad de un pensar filosófico sobre la amistad. En aras de la exposición, la reflexión sobre la amistad se puede descomponer en los siguientes apartados: la naturaleza de la amistad, el amor a sí mismo y la necesidad de la amistad. (shrink)

Resumen: En este artículo se presentan y discuten los resultados preliminares de una investigación en torno a la competencia lingüístico-comunicativa en mapuzungun de niños procedentes de una zona reconocida por su alta vitalidad lingüística. La muestra del estudio se compone de 34 niños mapuches, de 6 a 10 años. Los datos se recogieron mediante la aplicación de un instrumento de medición directa, realizada individualmente en dependencias de la escuela rural a la que asisten los participantes. Los resultados generales muestran que (...) la competencia en la lengua es de un bajo nivel, y que el desempeño es mejor en comprensión que en producción. Se destacan cuatro casos que presentan niveles de competencia media o alta, y que corresponden a niños de mayor edad. Se discuten las implicaciones de estos resultados a la luz de los procesos de adquisición y transmisión intergeneracional del mapuzungun.: This article presents and discusses the preliminary results of an investigation about the linguistic and communicative competence in mapuzungun of children from an area renowned for its high linguistic vitality. The sample consists of 34 Mapuche children between 6 and 10 years of age. Data were collected through the application of a direct measurement instrument. The application was carried out individually at the rural school attended by the participants. The overall results show low levels of language proficiency, and performance is better in comprehension than production. Four cases with medium or high level proficiency in mapuzungun, corresponding to older children, were highlighted. The implications of these results in light of the processes of language acquisition and the intergenerational transmission of mapuzungun are discussed. (shrink)

Rompant avec la conception traditionnelle du corps comme pure et simple res extensa en interaction avec une âme seule à même de sentir et de vouloir, laphénoménologie (E. Husserl, M. Merleau-Ponty, J. Patoèka, M. Henry, R. Barbaras,...) en déploie une approche vécue, faisant de la chair (Leib, en allemand) le site même de notre rapport sensible et pratique aux étants. Une telle perspective court cependant le risque de ne voir en l'incarnation qu'une condition de possibilité de la manifestation du monde (...) - et donc de passer sous silence la phénoménalké de cette chair vivante elle-même. C'est dans ce contexte qu'une phénoménologie du corps en émoi s'avère indispensable : au contraire du corps percevant et du corps agissant, simples mediums transparents d'une conscience tout entière auprès des choses, le corps ému, en vertu des bouleversements mêmes qui le caractérisent (larmes, rougissements, sudation,...), recouvre une prégnance certaine, et s'impose comme instance propre. En bref : seule l'émotion est somatophanie, c'est-à-dire manifestation du corps en tant que corps. Le présent volume se donne pour dessein d'étudier les différents versants de cette manifestation. La première partie, comprenant les contributions de Thomas Fuchs, Natalie Depraz, et Gabriel Mahéo, développe une réinterprétation incarnée des émotions intersubjectives - et en particulier de leur dimension politique. Au cours de la seconde partie, Charles Bobant, Grégori Jean, et Gilles A. Tiberghien s'interrogent sur la fonction-du corps ému au sein des multiples artistiques et de leurs réceptions esthétiques. Enfin, la troisième partie, composée des travaux d'Alexis Delamare, d'Aurélien Deudon, et de Daniel Vespermann, propose une série d'explorations phénoménologiques particulières - étude de la joie et de la tristesse, de lajouimance amoureuse, et des affects atmosphériques"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Praising wishful thinking is a serious risk that I am willing to run not only in this article commenting of Natalie Stoljar’s work but also elsewhere in my own scholarship. Although I will analyze her claims and will agree mostly with them, I will criticize her for stopping one step short adopting the desirability or weaker claim, when in it is not merely possible but necessary to go one step beyond arguing for the necessity or stronger claim. Accordingly, I (...) intend to present further grounds for endorsing “conceptual (legal) analysis pluralism” by distinguishing the three different inquiry or projects that are and must be integrated and stating the normative priority of one of them, i.e. the prescriptive, interpretive, and moral.Resumen:Alabar el “pensamiento ilusorio y bien intencionado” es un riesgo que estoy dispuesto a correr no solamente en este artículo para comentar el trabajo de Natalie Stoljar sino además en el resto de mi producción académica. Aun cuando voy a analizar su argumento y voy a estar de acuerdo en la mayor parte con ella, también la voy a criticar por detenerse un paso antes al adoptar la tesis de la deseabilidad o tesis débil, cuando no es meramente posible sino necesario ir un paso más allá al adoptar la tesis de la necesidad o tesis fuerte. Para tal efecto, intento presentar algunas razones adicionales para apoyar el “pluralismo del análisis (jurídico) conceptual” al distinguir las tres investigaciones o proyectos diferentes que están y deben estar integrados y establecer la prioridad normativa de uno de ellos, i.e. prescriptivo, interpretivo y moral. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the relationship between social epistemology and relativism in the context of feminist epistemology. I do this by focusing on one particular branch of feminist epistemology - a branch known as standpoint theory - and investigating the connection between this view and epistemic relativism. I begin by defining both epistemic relativism and standpoint theory, and by briefly recounting the standard way that the connection between these two views is understood. The literature at the moment focuses on (...) an aspect of standpoint theory called the epistemic advantage thesis, and on an aspect of relativism which has been called equality. I then show that the connection between relativism and standpoint theory actually turns on a different aspect of standpoint theory, known as the standpoint thesis, and on an aspect of relativism which has been called non-neutrality. I argue that shifting our attention to these other aspects reveals that standpoint theory is clearly and unavoidably relativist, but that this isn’t a problem - standpoint theory can capture everything that it set out to, even on a relativist understanding of the view. (shrink)

Sometimes we make a decision about an action we will undertake later and form an intention, but our judgment of what it is best to do undergoes a temporary shift when the time for action comes round. What makes it rational not to give in to temptation? Many contemporary solutions privilege diachronic rationality; in some “rational non-reconsideration” (RNR) accounts once the agent forms an intention, it is rational not to reconsider. This leads to other puzzles: how can someone be motivated (...) to follow a plan that is contrary to their current judgment? How can it be rational to form a plan to resist if we can predict that our judgment will shift? I show how these puzzles can be solved in a framework where there are multiple units of agency, distinguishing between the judgments of the timeslice and those of the person over time, and allowing that the timeslice can “self identify”, taking the person over time as the relevant unit of agency and doing intrapersonal team reasoning (with a different causal role for intentions than RNR accounts). On my account, resisting temptation is compatible with synchronic rationality, so synchronic and diachronic rationality are aligned. However, either resisting or succumbing to temptation can be instrumentally rational, depending on the unit of agency that is identified with. In order to show why we ought to resist temptation, we need to draw on a non-instrumental rationale. I sketch possible routes for doing this. (shrink)

Defences of perspectival realism are motivated, in part, by an attempt to find a middle ground between the realist intuition that science seems to tell us a true story about the world, and the Kuhnian intuition that scientific knowledge is historically and culturally situated. The first intuition pulls us towards a traditional, absolutist scientific picture, and the second towards a relativist one. Thus, perspectival realism can be seen as an attempt to secure situated knowledge without entailing epistemic relativism. A very (...) similar motivation is behind feminist standpoint theory, a view which aims to capture the idea that knowledge is socially situated, whilst retaining some kind of absolutism. Elsewhere I argue that the feminist project fails to achieve this balance; its commitment to situated knowledge unavoidably entails epistemic relativism (though of an unproblematic kind), which allows them to achieve all of their feminist goals. In this paper I will explore whether the same arguments apply to perspectival realism. And so I will be asking whether perspectival realism too is committed to an unproblematic kind of relativism, capable of achieving scientific goals; or, whether it succeeds in carving out a third view, between or beyond the relativism/absolutism dichotomy. (shrink)

In this paper I make the case for a feminist hinge epistemology in three steps. My first step is to explain hinge epistemologies as contemporary epistemologies that take Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty as their starting point. My second step is to make three criticisms of this literature as it currently stands. My third step is to introduce feminist epistemologies, which argue that social factors like race and gender affect what different people and groups justifiably believe, and argue that developing (...) a feminist hinge epistemology is both plausible and desirable. (shrink)

Feminist epistemologies hold that differences in the social locations of inquirers make for epistemic differences, for instance, in the sorts of things that inquirers are justified in believing. In this paper we situate this core idea in feminist epistemologies with respect to debates about social constructivism. We address three questions. First, are feminist epistemologies committed to a form of social constructivism about knowledge? Second, to what extent are they incompatible with traditional epistemological thinking? Third, do the answers to these questions (...) raise serious problems for feminist epistemologies? We argue that some versions of two of the main strands in feminist epistemology – feminist standpoint theory and feminist empiricism – are committed to a form of social constructivism, which requires certain departures from traditional epistemological thinking. But we argue that these departures are less problematic than one might think. Thus, (some) feminist epistemologies provide a plausible way of understanding how (some) knowledge might be socially constructed. (shrink)

Enclosed is a guidebook for philanthropists, advocates, and policymakers who want to do the most good possible. This book introduces the philosophy of “longtermism,” the idea that it is particularly important that we act now to safeguard future generations. -/- The future is vast in scale: depending on our choices in the coming centuries, the future could stretch for eons or it could dwindle into oblivion, and be inordinately good or inordinately bad. And yet future generations are utterly disenfranchised in (...) the world today: they cannot participate in our markets, our movements, or our civil society. This presents 21st Century philanthropists with a historically unprecedented opportunity to do good by protecting the long-term future. -/- The essays within are from the pioneers who have developed the intellectual foundations of longtermism, as well as the experts and advocates who are now putting it into practice. Readers will hear the case for longtermism from professors at the University of Oxford and Longview’s own founders; longtermist policy proposals from political philosophers, members of the House of Lords, and the All-party Parliamentary Group for Future Generations; the case for work on biosecurity, artificial intelligence, and climate change from leading experts; and the first ever essay on longtermist cultural change from the former Chief of Cabinet to the Finnish President. -/- Together, these essays chart the path forward toward maximising the good that we do for our grandchildren, our grandchildren’s grandchildren, and every generation beyond. (shrink)

Universities and other research institutions are increasingly providing additional training in research integrity to improve the quality and reliability of research. Various training courses have been developed, with diverse learning goals and content. Despite the importance of training that focuses on moral character and professional virtues, there remains a lack of training that adopts a virtue ethics approach. To address this, we, a European Commission-funded consortium, have designed a train-the-trainer programme for research integrity. The programme is based on (1) virtue (...) ethics, (2) the ethos of science, (3) learning by doing and (4) learner-centred teaching. The blended learning programme combines e-learning modules with participatory group sessions. Trainers are taught how to guide researchers through a series of structured exercises for fostering reflection on scientific virtues, and how to promote understanding and application of the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity. Trainers are provided with adaptable tools and resources that can be used and combined in different ways. The programme implementation began in Spring 2020 and 470 trainers have participated to date. When trainers were asked to grade – between 0 (very bad) and 10 (excellent) – the e-learning modules and the participatory exercises, 60% scored a grade 8 or higher (median = 8, IQR = 2) for the e-learning modules, whereas 80% scored a grade 8 or higher (median = 9, IQR = 1) for the participatory exercises. A majority felt that the training helped them as a trainer to learn about ways to organise and teach a research integrity course (82%) and would recommend the interactive exercises to others (92%). Trainers have educated over 3300 researchers in Europe using our virtue-based approach. The VIRT2UE train-the-trainer programme fosters research integrity by providing trainers with exercises and tools which enable them to stimulate the development of good researchers across Europe. (shrink)

Mainstream epistemologists don’t tend to discuss feminist epistemologies. They often don’t mention them in introductory courses or textbooks, and they almost invariably don’t take themselves to work on them. This is probably due to a suspicion that ‘feminist’ epistemologies are clouded by political motivations. In this paper I will argue two things. First, that this suspicion is misguided – a number of ‘mainstream’ epistemologists (specifically, hinge epistemologists), are in fact doing work which is entirely compatible with feminist epistemologies, and the (...) ‘extra ingredient’ required to turn a hinge epistemology into a feminist epistemology needn’t involve political motivations. And second, that bringing feminist epistemologies into the mainstream can benefit hinge epistemologies – by adding the extra ingredient which turns a hinge epistemology into a feminist epistemology, hinge epistemologists increase the motivations they can appeal to in support of their responses to scepticism. (shrink)

In her book Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology (2015), Annalisa Coliva puts forward an anti-sceptical proposal based on the idea that the notion of rationality extends to the unwarrantable presuppositions “that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible” (2015: 150). These presuppositions are commonly the target of sceptical arguments, and by showing that they are on the one hand unwarrantable, but on the other are constitutive components of rationality itself, she reveals that they are beyond rational doubt and thus avoids (...) scepticism. Part of Coliva’s defence of using extended rationality in this way involves distancing it from relativist interpretations, which she describes as “devastating” (2015: 120). She proposes two ways that someone might attempt to formulate epistemic relativism from her extended rationality view, and argues that both would be unsuccessful because they require describing alternative conceptions of rationality which are “unintelligible” (in the first case), or “inconceivable” (in the second). The superficial claim of this chapter is that Coliva’s arguments, as they stand, are insufficient to dismiss relativism. She fails to show that the conception of rationality needed for the first formulation of relativism is unintelligible, and overestimates the significance of the second formulation’s conception turning out to be inconceivable. But I also highlight a deeper problem: neither formulation follows a realistic blueprint for relativism, and so these were the wrong possibilities to consider in the first place. To address this issue, I propose a third, more plausible, way in which someone might attempt to formulate relativism on the basis of Coliva’s account. I leave open whether this strategy is successful, or whether a version of Coliva’s criticisms apply to it too. (shrink)

Background:Moral distress is a complex phenomenon frequently experienced by critical care nurses. Ethical conflicts in this practice area are related to technological advancement, high intensity work environments, and end-of-life decisions.Objectives:An exploration of contemporary moral distress literature was undertaken to determine measurement, contributing factors, impact, and interventions.Review Methods:This state of the science review focused on moral distress research in critical care nursing from 2009 to 2015, and included 12 qualitative, 24 quantitative, and 6 mixed methods studies.Results:Synthesis of the scientific literature revealed (...) inconsistencies in measurement, conflicting findings of moral distress and nurse demographics, problems with the professional practice environment, difficulties with communication during end-of-life decisions, compromised nursing care as a consequence of moral distress, and few effective interventions.Conclusion:Providing compassionate care is a professional nursing value and an inability to meet this goal due to moral distress may have devastating effects on care quality. Further study of patient and family outcomes related to nurse moral distress is recommended. (shrink)

Il y a un pari d'envergure, presque une provocation, à montrer l'ampleur et l'acuité des méthodes pratiques qui tissent le propos de Husserl dans un texte qui a été considéré par ses interprètes comme le livre le plus "métaphysique", à savoir celui où l'auteur prend parti pour une thèse philosophique souvent jugée éculée: l'idéalisme. Tout le destin de la phénoménologie s'est joué autour d'une prise de position contre son "tournant idéaliste" en 1913, Heidegger ayant ouvert les hostilités, suivi par Sartre, (...) Ricœur, Derrida et Levinas. A rebours de cette herméneutique constitutive de la critique philosophique, l'auteur cherche ici à faire voir un Husserl "praticien", "épistémologue", c'est-à-dire peu soucieux de défendre une position métaphysique. Cette épistémologie pratique de la phénoménologie peut être caractérisée comme un "empirisme transcendantal". Par là, un sens de la vérité émerge, qui puise sa validité dans l'expérience native du lecteur, c'est-à-dire dans son aptitude à vérifier par lui-même l'accord du concept en relation avec son vécu. La lecture expérientielle proposée prend alors un tour pragmatique, à l'horizon d'un renouvellement de la phénoménologie comme pratique. (shrink)

The diagnostic category of borderline personality disorder (BPD) has come under increasing criticism in recent years. In this paper, we analyze the role and impact of epistemic injustice, specifically testimonial injustice, in relation to the diagnosis of BPD. We first offer a critical sociological and historical account, detailing and expanding a range of arguments that BPD is problematic nosologically. We then turn to explore the epistemic injustices that can result from a BPD diagnosis, showing how they can lead to experiences (...) of testimonial injustice which impede patient engagement in meaning-making activities, thereby undermining standard therapeutic goals. We conclude by showing how our arguments bolster ongoing efforts to replace the diagnostic category of BPD with alternatives such as complex post-traumatic stress disorder. (shrink)